Here is Lillie's formulation of the paradox, taken from "The Gene and the Ontogenetic Process," published in 1927:
With reference to the processes of embryonic segregation [i.e., differentiation -RB], genetics is to a certain extent the victim of its own rigor. It is apparently not only sound, but apparently almost universally accepted genetic doctrine to-day that each cell receives the entire complex of genes. It would, therefore, appear to be self-contradictory to attempt to explain embryonic segregation by behavior of the genes which are ex hyp. the same in every cell (Lillie 1927, p. 365). This argument purports to establish that classical genetics does not (and perhaps cannot) provide the fundamental theory of heredity. Genetics can provide an analysis of the transmission of determinants (to use an old-fashioned word) or genes, and those determinants may alter the final phenotype of the organism, but genetics cannot provide an account of whatever it is that controls development so that the determinants contribute to the formation of an ordered whole, an organism with thus-and-such a fundamental structure. Whatever it is that does that job must do so by acting in an as-yet unknown manner to produce the correct temporal sequence and spatial distribution of stuffs and cells so as to yield (for example) bone, muscle, liver, kidney, and nerves, all properly organized to yield an animal.
Without a theory that can explain the mechanisms of ontogenesis, so the argument runs, any account of inheritance is radically incomplete. By locating genes on chromosomes, classical genetics became committed to the equality of the genic complement in every cell and was thus unable to provide a theory of ontogenesis. Accordingly, embryologists could argue that the equality of the genes in every cell type proved the necessity of providing an account of an inherited system of controls governing differentiation independent of the transmission of genes.
Not all embryologists accepted this account of what was missing, and embryology did not offer a satisfactory theory of this putative second system of inheritance in the 1920s and 1930s. Nonetheless, embryology was at least properly situated to provide such a theory or to bring forth the necessary preliminary empirical knowledge of the ways in which development and differentiation work. Accordingly, Lillie sums up his stand as follows:
The present postulate of genetics is that the genes are always the same in a given individual, in whatever place, at whatever time, within the life history of the individual, except for the occurrence of mutations or abnormal disjunctions, to which the same principles then apply. The essential problem of development is precisely that differentiation in relation to space and time within the life-history of the individual which genetics appears implicitly to ignore.
The progress of genetics and of physiology of development can only result in a sharper definition of the two fields, and any expectation of their reunion (in a Weismannian sense, [that is, into a unified theory of heredity]) is in my opinion doomed to disappointment. Those who desire to make genetics the basis of physiology of development will have to explain how an unchanging complex can direct the course of an ordered developmental stream (Lillie 1927, p. 367 ).
On the whole, geneticists thought that the paradox posed no fundamental threat to the foundations of their discipline. The differences between their reactions and those of the embryologists (and many other biologists interested in development) is in this respect quite fascinating, the more so in light of the fact that around 1900 the problems of heredity and development were generally thought to be inseparable. In this chapter I will start in that era in order to set some of the central issues in context, then examine certain features of the gulf that had opened up between genetics and embryology by the 1930s, and, finally, address certain aspects of the partial resolution of Lillie's paradox achieved by the late 1950s -and the conditions that had to be met to achieve that resolution.
Stage Setting
The conflict we are examining was institutionalized, in the United States at least, as a conflict between geneticists and embryologists or, later, developmental biologists. I shall argue, however, that its roots were not originally institutional or disciplinary. The issues in question took their specific form during the great transformation of biology into an experimental science at the end of the nineteenth century. This transformation, as Scott Gilbert among others has argued, was shaped by an important series of dichotomies belonging to turn of the century biology -dichotomies between preformation and epigenesis, structure and function, morphology and physiology, nucleus and cytoplasm, discontinuous variation and continuous variation, heredity and development. Jane Maienschein's work suggests a useful approach to the situation of experimental biologists interested in heredity and development around the turn of the century (see, e.g., Maienschein 1981 Maienschein , 1983 Maienschein , 1986 Maienschein , 1987 Maienschein , 1991 . A good number of themConklin, His, Loeb, Morgan, Whitman, and Wilson are good examples -sought to achieve a rapprochement between the approaches taken by biologists whose predilections lay on opposite sides of the dichotomies on my list. Numerous attempts were made to reconcile disparate styles of work and the conflicting theoretical commitments with which they were allied. The issues in question centered on cytology, embryology, evolution, morphology, and theoretical analyses of heredity. As we shall see, the rapprochement failed, and the most prominent parts of the work with which I am concerned were ultimately distributed into the disciplines of genetics and embryology.
I shall argue that, as things developed during the century, the distinction between nucleus and cytoplasm -what Ephrussi in the late fifties called the geographical distinction -came to be an obstacle to an integrated understanding of heredity and development, an obstacle that had to be overcome before there could be any real hope of breaking down the conceptual barriers between genetics and developmental biology. One of the reasons for this is that cellular geography became connected with specific positions with respect to the dichotomies that I have listed. A principal target of this chapter is to gain a better understanding of this fact.
The Issues
It is now widely recognized among historians of biology that the separation of studies of heredity into two distinct disciplines, which had the labels 'genetics' and 'embryology' by the late 1920s, occurred during the period between, roughly, Weismann's publication of Das Keimplasma (The Germplasm) in 1892 (Weismann 1892 (Weismann , 1893 ) and Morgan's The Theory of the Gene in 1926 (Morgan 1926) . There has been considerable study of the formation of genetics as a separate discipline -though I think it has not been recognized how much the growth of genetics in the U.S. shaped the institutionalization of genetics in its early phases -and rather less investigation of the formation of twentieth century embryology as a distinct discipline. I shall address three aspects of the separation of these two disciplines. These concern conceptual issues, matters of experimental methodology, and the sociological and institutional issues that came to be of pressing importance. An analysis of the interactions between the scientists involved or of the disciplinary dialectic that they produced must deal with all three of these, however sketchily.
I start with some conceptual points. The application of experimental technique to the study of heredity and development had its beginnings some ten or fifteen years before the turn of the century. At the time, particularly in Germany, there were a number of selfconscious attempts to bring experimental techniques to bear in investigations concerning the interconnections among evolution, heredity, and development. The major figures hoped to provide an alternative to 'merely descriptive' natural history and embryology and either to resolve the issues raised by such speculative theorizing as that of Haeckel and Darwin and their intellectual descendents, or to set those issues aside. There was growing discontent with the inability of evolutionary theory to supply sound evidence for its speculative phylogenies and for the adaptive or non-adaptive scenarios that were being offered in order to account for evolutionary history. There was also strong interest in setting biology on a sound mechanistic or physicalistic foundation. Finally, there were all of the new discoveries regarding the nucleus and the internal structures of cells, hastened and facilitated by improvements in microscopy and, especially, in staining techniques. Accordingly, considerable pressure was generated to develop a suitable experimental methodology for investigating issues touching on heredity and to reformulate the problems involved in such a way as to allow the posing of experimentally resolvable questions. The test of explanatory adequacy in this new tradition would be demonstration of experimentally adequate mechanisms rather than explanatory consilience of speculative theories in the style of Darwin. [Added 2003:] For general reviews that introduce the relevant literature, see (Maienschein 1990 , Olby 1990 .
At the same time, it was impossible to escape the larger issues posed by the grand theories and findings of the nineteenth century -and the styles of work developed during that century. It was impossible for biologists with theoretical interests to avoid taking positions with respect to the conflict between old-fashioned morphology and embryology (with their Baupläne and embranchements of the animal kingdom) on the one hand and theories of evolution, whether Darwinian or not, on the other. It was impossible to avoid some sort of contact with the issue of preformation versus epigenesis in ontogeny. It was impossible to escape the questions posed by the discovery of the ubiquity of cells and nuclei and the growing knowledge of the dance of the chromosomes in mitosis and meiosis. And it was impossible for biologists with synthetic interests not to face up to issues regarding the production and the inheritance of variation.
Speaking loosely, the grand divide with which I am concerned is marked by the reactions of different investigators to the findings regarding the nucleus made from about 1885 on. Those who came to see the nucleus as insulated from traffic with the external world and to regard the seemingly equal contributions of egg and sperm nuclei to the properties of the progeny of their union as decisive, e.g., Roux (see, e.g., Roux 1883, translated as Roux 1991) , tended toward some form of preformationism. After all, if the sperm -which contributed only its nucleus to the zygote -is responsible for half of the inherited characters of the organism, then the two nuclei together must be the source of all inherited characters. If the nucleus is insulated from events in other cells and insulated from the environment, inheritance of acquired characters must be impossible. And if nuclear contents are fixed at the moment of the union between sperm and egg nuclei, the entire hereditary potential of the organism must be determined at that point. Furthermore, as it slowly became clear that, in spite of the exceptional behavior of the chromosomes of such organisms as Ascaris, 3 the chromosomes are constant and individual, definite structures became available to serve as the bearers of the determinants that governed the characters of the organism. Such considerations fostered an easy alliance between morphologically inclined microscopists and preformationists, between Weismannian evolutionists and advocates of discontinuous variation. (Incidentally, Weismann was one of those who used the term 'evolution' in its old meaning of unfolding according to a predetermined plan, so that he concluded Das Keimplasma by remarking that ontogeny proceeds by evolution rather than epigenesis!)
On the other hand, many considerations from the study of development pointed in an opposite direction. Differentiation, it became clear, depended on the formation and localization of unlike substances in different regions of the protoplasm of the egg. To play any role in metabolism, differentiation, or regeneration, the nucleus had to be in a cytoplasm: It mattered what cytoplasm it was in and, in at least some cases, where it was in the cytoplasm. Many texts make similar claims (e.g., Driesch 1894 , Morgan 1910 , Wilson 1896 ). Conklin, for one, put it this way in 1908:
Neither the nucleus nor the cytoplasm can exist long independently of the other; differentiations are dependent upon the interaction of these two parts of the cell; the entire germ cell, and not merely the nucleus or cytoplasm is transformed in the embryo or larva; and it therefore seems necessary to conclude that both nucleus and cytoplasm are involved in the mechanism of heredity (Conklin 1908, p. 95 (Conklin 1908, p. 98) .
The poles of the debate are now sketched in. Those who focused on the nucleus were at one extreme. They found morphological structures (the chromosomes), which they believed to be, or to carry, the determinants of heredity. These varied discontinuously, yielding what come to be known as mutations. Such views fall within a preformationist tradition. The biologists who focused on the physiology of development were at the other extreme. They found continuous variation in the cytoplasm, with regional differentiations affecting the properties of cells in various ways and sometimes determining the fate of the descendants of those cells. Most of them treated hereditary variation as continuous and held that there was at least some room for environmental influence on heredity, as shown by the consequences of alterations of egg cytoplasm. These views belong in an epigenesist tradition. In the middle were many who hoped to reconcile these two aspects of heredity.
Separation
Between 1890 and 1910, the term 'heredity' underwent a transformation. The change of meaning is not easy to track, because it took place in stages and because the transformation worked differently in different individuals, disciplines, and national traditions. In the case of Thomas Hunt Morgan, who, until the latter part of 1910, was a friend of the cytoplasm in the style of Conklin, the transition was abrupt. Here, for example, are the opening sentences of his last major anti-Mendelian piece, published in 1910:
We have come to look upon the problem of heredity as identical with the problem of development. The word heredity stands for those properties of germcells that find their expression in the developing and developed organism. When we speak of the transmission of characters from parent to offspring, we are speaking metaphorically; for we now realize that it is not characters that are transmitted to the child from the body of the parent, but that the parent carries over the material common to both parent and offspring (Morgan 1910, p. 449). This definition of heredity is the old one; it does not distinguish clearly between determination of an hereditary potential and differentiation or development of that potential. That distinction is precisely the one that was hammered out, at least in part, during the period in question, most especially in connection with the determination of sex. In fact, Morgan was a late convert; by 1910 cytological work had pretty well established that sex is determined in at least some cases by the chromosome complement and/or the determinants it carries. The determination of sex made it clear that one could learn what was transmitted -i.e., in one sense, inherited -and that what was transmitted (e.g. an X rather than a Y chromosome) then determined or, together with other factors, co-determined major properties of the organism (such as sex). Furthermore, understanding this did nothing to show how the properties or characters determined by the inherited constitution are brought about and yielded no explanation of the control of development. In short (and Morgan proclaimed as much as early as 1911), it is necessary to distinguish hereditary determination of (the potential for producing) characters from development or differentiation, the process by which those characters are realized. Here is how he formulated the point in 1917:
The most common misunderstanding arises, I venture to think, from a confusion of the problem concerned with the sorting out of the hereditary materials (the genes) to the eggs and sperms, with the problems concerning the subsequent action of these genes in the development of the embryo (Morgan, 1917, p. 514) .
It is readily apparent that investigation of heredity in the new sense calls for radically different methods than investigation of development. Not surprisingly, geneticists were keenly aware of this fact. Thus as early as 1915 Morgan, Sturtevant, Muller, and Bridges defended the independence of their methodology from any considerations regarding development in their famous text, The Mechanism of Mendelian Heredity:
It is sometimes said that our theories of heredity must remain superficial until we know something of the reactions that transform the egg into an adult. There can be no question of the paramount importance of finding out what takes place during development. The efforts of all students of experimental embryology have been directed for several years toward this goal. It may even be true that this information, when gained, may help us to a better understanding of the factorial [i.e., gene] theory -we can not tell; for a knowledge of the chemistry of all of the pigments in an animal or plant might still be very far removed from an understanding of the chemical constitution of the hereditary factors by whose activity the pigments are ultimately produced. However this may be, the farreaching significance of Mendel's principles remains, and gives us a numerical basis for the study of heredity. Although Mendel's law does not explain the phenomena of development, and does not pretend to explain them, it stands as a scientific explanation of heredity, because it fulfils all the requirements of any causal explanation (Morgan, et al. 1915, pp. 226-227 and at pp. 280-281 in the 1922 rev. ed.).
An interesting feature of the institutionalization of biology in America during the first two decades of this century is the way in which institutionally independent situations were created for biologists who worked with the two different accounts of heredity. In good part this was possible because of the expansion of biology during this period in America. The expansion made possible the formation of new institutions that fostered work in a large variety of styles, without excessive concern about making contact with the issues raised by those who worked in other traditions. In this regard, the situation in America is quite different than that in any of the European countries. Correspondingly, the separation of genetics from embryology was more severe in this country than it was in Europe.
In any event, genetics was institutionalized in the United States in ways that did not require geneticists to maintain contact with issues in evolution or development. 4 This may be seen in the formation and history of the genetics groups at such places as Cornell, Columbia, The Bussey Institution at Harvard, and the Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory of Experimental Evolution; in the development of genetic research in many of state agricultural stations, state land grant colleges and universities, and private colleges; in the circumstances surrounding the founding of such journals as The Journal of Heredity and Genetics and the transformation of other journals such as The American Naturalist; and so on. By a variety of means, American genetics acquired an institutional base far stronger than any in Europe, one that fostered research into heredity in the new sense on a scale not possible elsewhere, one that removed the responsibility of facing the issue raised by such friends of the cytoplasm as Conklin and Lillie. By the late 1920s, there was no hope of reconciliation between genetics and embryology on the basis of ongoing work of the sorts then common in the U.S. The institutional separation of research in genetics and embryology was thorough and the programs of research of the principal figures across these disciplines were sufficiently divergent that there was little chance of bringing their work into intimate contact. Furthermore, the practical success and high reputation of genetic research left many embryologists feeling jealous and threatened. A major boundary -indeed, a political border as Garland Allen, Scott Gilbert, and Jan Sapp have shown -had arisen between the two disciplines, between students of the nucleus and students of the cytoplasm or the cell as a whole. Observers watching this boundary in the 1930s might notice some reconciliatory forays across the border, but they would also see a variety of breastworks going up and a number of potshots being taken.
How Seriously Should We Take the Paradox?
There are a great many signs that the estrangement between embryology and genetics during the 1930s was serious. In the first instance the conflict was over the degree to which the materials present in the nucleus of a fertilized egg were by themselves sufficient (or very nearly sufficient) to account for the potentialities or the characters of the fully developed organism that would grow out of that egg. But, as I have been arguing, the conflict was in many ways a continuation of an older conflict between preformationists and epigenesists and was caught up in disagreements over the proper tools for examining such issues.
Lillie's paradox was widely known (though not under that label) and widely thought by embryologists to be of great importance as an indicator of the limitations of genetics. For example, in France, where the problem of development was always influential in theories of heredity, the paradox was widely deployed as a central argument against the fundamentality of Mendelian inheritance. Lillie's formulation of the paradox had no particular influence there, but it is common to see the paradox used in support of an argument for there being a second -and far more fundamental -system of inheritance over and above the Mendelian one.
5
The quotations in the appendix to this chapter show how easy it is to find versions of the paradox in the literature. A second glance at those quotations shows considerable variation in the conclusions drawn from the paradox. Let us ask exactly what inferences should be based on the paradox and whether it ought to have been taken so seriously.
One of the earliest statements of the paradox I have found was made by Driesch in 1894.
Insofar as it carries a nucleus, every cell, during ontogenesis, carries the totality of all primordia; insofar as it contains a specific cytoplasmic cell body, it is specifically enabled by this to respond to specific effects only... When nuclear material is activated, then, under its guidance, the cytoplasm of the cell that had first influenced the nucleus is in turn itself changed, and thus the basis is established for a new elementary process, which itself is not only a result but also a cause (Driesch 1894 ).
Driesch's response to the uniformity of the contents of the nucleus, like that of E. B. Wilson in 1896, supposes that there is interaction between chromosomes and cytoplasm in such a way that the primordia -which, for present purposes can be lumped with Mendelian factors -are activated or otherwise regulated by the cytoplasm, initiating a series of reciprocal interactions that determine the course of determination and development. In contrast to Driesch, Wilson, a friend of the nucleus, goes on to say the following:
In accepting this view we admit that the cytoplasm of the egg is, in a measure, the substratum of inheritance, but it is so only by virtue of its relation to the nucleus which is, so to speak, the ultimate court of appeal. The nucleus cannot operate without a cytoplasmic field in which its peculiar powers may come into play; but this field is created and moulded by itself. Both are necessary to development; the nucleus alone suffices for the inheritance of specific possibilities of development (Wilson 1896, p. 327) .
Thus, before the turn of the century, a general scheme was in hand that allowed a response to the paradox. Why was that scheme not generally accepted? What further considerations gave the paradox its bite?
I do not have a full answer to these questions, but it seems quite clear that the answers lie in the commitment of friends of the nucleus, including geneticists, to some version or other of preformationism and to certain hypotheses about the physiology of genes. The genes are what they are; they always act, and they must all act to make the organism. This illustrates my claim that the geographically distinct entities, nucleus and cytoplasm, became conceptually tied to philosophical stances regarding the manner in which organisms are formed. Many friends of the nucleus thought that there had to be some sense in which, once the nucleus was formed, the organism was all there, at least potentially, at least in its hereditary traits. The friends of the cytoplasm thought that no entities could determine the organism in that way, that the process of development that was revealed in their observations and experiments took precedence over, or dominated, any mere material particles or substances in determining what an organism would become. As the following quotations and those in the appendix show, commitments of these sorts can be found on all sides:
If Mendelian characters are due to the presence or absence of a specific chromosome [or part of a chromosome], as Sutton's hypothesis assumes, how can we account for the fact that the tissues and organs of an animal differ from each other when they all contain the same chromosome complex... [W]e must be prepared to admit that the evidence is entirely in favor of the view that the differentiation of the body is due to other factors that modify the cells in one way or in another. This consideration is, to my mind, a convincing proof that we have to deal with two sets of factors -the common inheritance of all the cells to produce all the kinds of tissues and organs in the body, and the limitation of that property in the course of development. If the former is due to the chromosomes and the unspecialized parts of the cytoplasm, the latter may be due to the local changes that the relation of the parts to each other calls forth. It might even be argued that since in the development we find no evidence of a sorting out of the chromosomes that produce special parts, the individual chromosomes can not stand each as the representative of these parts, but rather that each part needs the entire set of chromosomes for its normal life (Morgan 1910, p. 477) .
As I have already pointed out, there is an interesting problem concerning the possible interaction between the chromatin of the cells and the protoplasm during development. The visible differentiation of the embryonic cells takes place in the protoplasm. The most common genetic assumption is that the genes remain the same throughout this time. It is, however, conceivable that the genes also are building up more and more, or are changing in some way, as development proceeds in response to that part of the protoplasm in which they come to lie, and that these changes have a reciprocal influence on the protoplasm. It may be objected that this view is incompatible with the evidence that by changing the location of cells, as in grafting experiments and in regeneration, the cells may come to differentiate in another direction. But the objection is not so serious as it may appear if the basic constitution of the gene always remains the same, the postulated additions or changes in the genes being of the same order as those that take place in the protoplasm. If the latter can change its differentiation in a new environment without losing its fundamental properties, why may not the genes also? The question is clearly beyond the range of present evidence, but as a possibility it need not be rejected (Morgan 1934, p. 234 ).
Can we refute one or the other of these positions [that "the totality of the hereditary material is given in the genes" or that there are two systems of inheritance] by experiments at this time? Not by means of classical Mendelism. For in order to recognize or to localize genes, we need two organisms that differ in some particular traits, and even if we can trace certain fundamental properties (such as chromosome form or size) back to Mendelian genes, it appears to me to be completely impossible to remove the force of the dualists' arguments by analysis of hybrids. Johannsen put it like this: "...By analysis of hybrids we have examined only the clothing, the underlying organization remains unanalyzed. Whether we will ever be able to strip kinds of organisms [Gattungen, a word then used for races, species, and genera in German] of their superficial characteristics in such a way as to reveal the ultimate X of our formulas -a fundamental substance, something quite general and organic, something that, like a homozygote, is not accessible to Mendelian analysis -that remains an unanswerable question (Hertwig 1934, p. 428) [translated by RB, emphases in the original, references omitted].
Since cellular differentiation takes place in the cytoplasm, we are concerned here more directly with this constituent of the cell, bearing in mind, however, that the cytoplasm is accompanied and ultimately controlled by the genic complex in the chromosomes. Since the latter is presumably the same for all cells of the organism, differences between cells must arise through interaction between the constant genom [sic] and the locally variable cytoplasm in which they ultimately become visible (Harrison 1940, p. 93) . Now that the necessity of relating the data of genetics to embryology is generally recognized and the "Wanderlust" of geneticists is beginning to urge them in our direction, it may not be inappropriate to point out a danger in this threatened invasion.
The prestige of success enjoyed by the gene theory might easily become a hindrance to the understanding of development by directing our attention solely to the genom [sic], whereas cell movements, differentiation and in fact all developmental processes are actually effected by the cytoplasm. Already we have theories that refer the processes of development to genic action and regard the whole performance as no more than the realization of the potencies of the genes. Such theories are altogether too one-sided (Harrison 1937, p. 372 ).
The main point that I wish to make by means of this spotty selection of relevant quotations is that the paradox becomes decisive as soon as it is thought both that the nucleus contains all of the determinants for the hereditary properties of the organism and that the full complement of genes is always essentially the same in all cells. For if the nucleus or its contents act as a unit to achieve determination and the nuclei in all of the different cells of an organism are equivalent, then there is nothing left by reference to which one can account for the differences between the cells. Put this way, it becomes obvious that the paradox represents a serious challenge to the research program of classical genetics, for that program was committed to the claims just made: the full complement of genes is present in virtually all cells, the nucleus contains, with but minor exceptions, all of the hereditary determinants of the organism, and all genes are involved in the formation of all properties of the organism.
Steps toward a Resolution
The problem of the control of development, posed in one form by Lillie's paradox, is by no means wholly resolved today. Yet the paradox, in the forms we have been examining, no longer poses a threat to contemporary genetics. I turn to aspects of the transition that tamed the paradox not yet widely examined in the literature, although some of them have been discussed in articles by Scott Gilbert (Gilbert 1988 (Gilbert , 1991 and by (Sapp 1987 ; see also Hamburger 1980 , Sapp 1986 ). Sapp examines various attempts to break the nuclear monopoly within genetics by finding factors, substances, or states in the cytoplasm that determine heredity. As he shows, difficulties of the sort we have been discussing were employed to support a number of diffuse countercurrents within genetics, mostly in Europe and mostly outside the mainstream of the institutionalized discipline. By the 1950s, however, the situation had changed. Various workers around Sonneborn in this country, a number of French geneticists around Ephrussi and Lwoff, many of the people working on the genetics of single-celled organisms and phage, various Germans (some expatriate), and a considerable number of allies of the Morgan school were seriously investigating cytoplasmic phenomena. I highlight here something that Sapp points out, but which I gloss somewhat differently than he does. This is the importance of the recognition, achieved in some circles during the late fifties, that the geographical distinction between nucleus and cytoplasm was not the key to understanding control of differentiation and development, but a red herring and a distraction. The critical point was an abstract one; it turned on developing a distinction between the genetic system and the allied epigenetic control systems that regulate the activity of genes, wherever they are located, and on working out the details of the interactions between genetic and epigenetic systems. 6 There are far too many strands to the story of the transition between the two points of view for me to enter into serious detail. Instead, I shall point out a couple of markers that illustrate the character of the change and suggest where to turn to work out an account of it. The markers are, I think, more important than is widely known, but they do not contain the germ of the whole story, which involves elements from biochemistry, DNA research, embryology, cytology, mainstream Mendelian genetics, operations research, virology, and on and on. Nonetheless, the work to which I shall call attention precedes by a few years the most frequently cited turning point in the analysis of gene regulation, namely, the Lwoff-Monod-Jacob-Elie Wollman et al. work on the operon. What is involved is precisely the recognition that the geographical distinction between nucleus and cytoplasm worked a disservice in the attempt to understand hereditary control of development, especially insofar as it was allied to the sort of preformationistepigenesist debate that has been our subject to this point. The catalyst (though, of course, it comes at the end of a long chain of preparatory studies) was an unpublished talk by David Nanney, a student of Tracy Sonneborn (a leading worker on paramecium genetics and a strong advocate of the importance of cytoplasmic genetic factors) at a meeting on Extrachromosomal Heredity held early in 1957 in France. Nanney's views were put forward in a widely influential article of Boris Ephrussi's, "The cytoplasm and somatic cell variation" (Ephrussi 1958 ), delivered in 1957, and in Nanney's article, "Epigenetic control systems" (Nanney 1958 ). I will cite Nanney at some length and then add a brief conclusion.
Nanney's article begins with a paragraph summarizing recent work supporting the ideas that DNA (or occasionally RNA) is the genetic material, that a single strand of DNA serves as the template for the reproduction of a complementary strand, and that certain regions in a strand of DNA (or its complement) embody information in some way so as to specify the sequence of amino acids in corresponding proteins. He then writes:
This view of nature of the genetic material... permits, moreover, a clearer conceptual distinction than has previously been possible between two types of cellular control systems. On the one hand, the maintenance of a "library of specificities," both expressed and unexpressed, is accomplished by a template replicating mechanism. On the other hand, auxiliary mechanisms with different principles of operation are involved in determining which specificities are to be expressed in any particular cell. Even without specifying precisely how these other mechanisms operate, the distinction between mechanisms involving template replication and "other mechanisms" is reasonably clear, even though both are involved in determining cellular characteristics. Difficulties arise, however, when one attempts to determine whether observed differences in cellular properties are due to differences in the "primary genetic material" or to differences in other cellular constituents. Some of the difficulties can be made apparent by setting forth certain general propositions related to the supplementary regulatory systems for which evidence is now available. To simplify the discussion of these two types of systems, they will be referred to as "genetic systems" and "epigenetic systems." The term "epigenetic" is chosen to emphasize the reliance of these systems on the genetic systems and to underscore their significance in developmental processes (Nanney 1958, p. 712). Here are Nanney's five general propositions, with a small part of his amplifying text: These observations [of stable epigenetic homeostasis] create a real problem. One operational definition for "hereditary differences" has involved the indefinite perpetuation of cellular differences during growth in the same environment. Yet instances are known in which cellular differences may be maintained in the absence of detectable genetic or environmental differences. Hence the observation of indefinite persistence of differences does not distinguish persistent homeostasis due to DNA maintenance (genetic homeostasis) from persistent homeostasis due to epigenetic regulation (epigenetic homeostasis). Moreover, great difficulty is encountered in separating, on any conceptual basis, epigenetic systems controlling differences which persist indefinitely from systems maintaining differences for shorter periods of time, and these, in turn, from systems relating to differences which disappear immediately when cells are placed together in the same environment. "Cellular memory" is not an absolute attribute… 5. Some Epigenetic Devices May Be Localized in the Nucleus. Some attempts to characterize cellular regulatory agencies have placed considerable reliance on a geographical distinction; the genetic systems were considered to reside in the nucleus and on the chromosomes, to be stable and insulated from environmental alterations. The supplementary systems were thought to occupy the cytoplasm, to be more flexible and responsive to environmental alterations. While this distinction may have some general validity, its usefulness in particular cases may be slight. First, some of the systems of greatest interest are not amenable to the operations permitting a distinction between nuclear and cytoplasmic bases, i.e., breeding analysis or nuclear transplantation. Second, some genetic material occurs in the cytoplasm, although its common occurrence there is debatable. More serious are observations which suggest that some epigenetic control systems are located in the nucleus. The studies on nuclear differentiation in amphibian development provide perhaps the most dramatic single example of this evidence. Studies on the serotypes in Salmonella, however, go even further in suggesting that such control systems may even be localized on the "chromosomes" themselves. If such systems are so localized and particularly if they manifest considerable stability, they would behave in breeding analyses in a manner strictly comparable to genetic systems and would be indistinguishable from them on this basis alone. … In short, Nanney argues that (1) the distinction between nucleus and cytoplasm is largely irrelevant or only accidentally relevant; (2) the crucial distinction is between encoded information (contained in the genetic system) and the various systems for releasing or controlling the expression of that information; and (3) with the operational tools available in the late 1950s one could not securely distinguish between changes of genetic content and long-term self-perpetuating changes in the state of a control system. While Nanney and Ephrussi were, perhaps, not the most important proponents of these three claims, and while the claims were supported by very complex and broad sorts of evidence drawn from quite various investigations, the rapid acceptance of these or similar views among a large number of geneticists and at least some developmental biologists in the late fifties and early sixties marks the end of the story to which this chapter is devoted.
Concluding Remarks
Most biologists these days resist the intrusion of philosophers and other outsiders on their territory. This is understandable -and it is probably sound policy when the outsiders do not make a proper effort to gain full control of the content and methods of the biological work in question. Yet, as the history that I examined today illustrates, all biology contains implicit philosophy, not all of it sound. This suggests that, at least occasionally, it would be desirable to foster interaction across the difficult disciplinary barriers separating biologists and philosophers.
In this chapter, for example, it has become clear that the geographical distinction between nucleus and cytoplasm came to be fraught with a great deal of ideological and philosophical baggage. Together with technical and methodological obstacles impeding a unified approach to heredity and development, divergence in problem choice, and plain old turf battles, the philosophical barriers helped to block communication between geneticists and embryologists for a crucial period lasting some 30 or 40 years.
The stereotyped extreme positions that each side ascribed to the other -reflected in the sharp dichotomies set forth above -made no philosophical and little biological sense. Alternative views, such as I quoted from Driesch and Wilson, were widely available in the literature from the 1890s forward. Perhaps an outsider, properly placed and properly engaged in the debate might have helped reduce the temptation to erect barriers between genetics and embryology and might have helped to bring some of the principals to recognize that there is more to inheritance than they dreamt of in their philosophies.
Appendix for Chapter 10: Additional and Expanded Quotations
My doubts as to the validity of Darwin's theory were for a long time not confined to this point alone: the assumption of the existence of preformed constituents of all parts of the body seemed to me far too easy a solution of the difficulty, besides entailing an impossibility in the shape of an absolutely inconceivable aggregation of primary constituents. I therefore endeavoured to see if it were not possible to imagine that the germ-plasm, though of complex structure, was not composed of such an immense number of particles, and that its further complication arose subsequently in the course of development. In other words, what I sought was a substance from which the whole organism might arise by epigenesis, and not by evolution. After repeated attempts in which I more than once imagined myself successful, but all of which broke down when further tested by facts, I finally became convinced that an epigenetic development is an impossibility. Moreover, I found an actual proof of the reality of evolution, which...is so simple that I can scarcely understand how it was possible that it should have escaped my notice so long (Weismann 1893 , as quoted in Maienschein 1986 ).
...we reach the following conception. The primary determining cause of development lies in the nucleus, which operates by setting up a continuous series of specific metabolic changes in the cytoplasm. This process begins during ovarian growth, establishing the external form of the egg, its primary polarity, and the distribution of substances within it. The cytoplasmic differentiations thus set up form as it were a framework within which the subsequent operations take place, in a more or less fixed course, and which itself becomes ever more complex as development goes forward.... (Wilson 1896 , as quoted by Sander 1986 .
Heredity is to-day the central problem of biology. The problem may be approached from many sides -that of the breeder, the experimenter, the statistician, the physiologist the embryologist, the cytologist -but the mechanism of heredity can be studied best by the investigation of the germ cells and their development....
The comparison of heredity to the transmission of property from parents to children has produced confusion in the scientific as well as in the popular mind... [I]n a literal sense parental characteristics are never transmitted to children. Every new individual...owes its similarity to its parent to the fact that it was once a part of it, and not to something which has been "transmitted" from one generation to the next. Furthermore from its earliest to its latest stage an individual is one and the same organism; the egg of a frog is a frog in an early stage of development and the characteristics of the adult frog develop out of the egg, but are not transmitted through it by some "bearer of heredity." Indeed, heredity is not a peculiar or unique principle for it is only similarity of growth and differentiation in successive generations. The fertilized egg cell undergoes a certain form of cleavage and gives rise to cells of particular size and structure, and step by step these are converted into a certain type of blastula, gastrula, larva, and adult. In fact, the whole process of development is one of growth and differentiation, and similarity of these in parents and offspring constitutes hereditary likeness. The causes of heredity are thus reduced to the causes of the successive differentiations of development, and the mechanism of heredity is merely the mechanism of differentiation... Differentiation, and hence heredity, consists in the main in the appearance of unlike substances in protoplasm and their localization in definite regions or cells. Such a definition is as applicable to the latest stages of differentiation, such as the formation of muscle fibers, as it is to the earliest differentiations of the germ cells, and the one is as truly a case of inheritance as is the other...
It is known that constructive metabolism, differentiation and regeneration never occur in the absence of a nucleus. On the other hand, Verworn has shown that the nucleus alone is incapable of performing these functions, and he maintains that the chief role in the life of the cell can not be assigned to either the nucleus or the cytoplasm, but that both are concerned in vital phenomena... [In sum], there is good reason to believe that the different substances which appear in the differentiation of a tissue cell arise through the interaction of the nucleus and cytoplasm, and not from either of these alone...
Finally we may conclude that the nucleus plays a less important role in the localization of different substances than in the formation of those substances. Nevertheless, in differentiation, as well as the metabolism, there is every reason to believe that the entire cell is a physiological unit. Neither the nucleus nor the cytoplasm can exist long independently of the other; differentiations are dependent upon the interaction of these two parts of the cell; the entire germ cell, and not merely the nucleus or cytoplasm is transformed in the embryo or larva; and it therefore seems necessary to conclude that both nucleus and cytoplasm are involved in the mechanism of heredity....
[In spite of the immense cytological evidence cited in support of the claim that] the chromosomes are the only "bearers of the inheritance material," [the experimental evidence is not decisive]...
[On the contrary, equally strong evidence shows] that many fundamental differentiations are found in the cytoplasm of the egg at the time of fertilization and immediately after. As evidences of such differentiations may be cited, (1) polarity and symmetry, (2) differential cleavages, (3) positions and proportions of important organ bases, (4) various types of egg organization, (5) (Conklin 1908 , italics in the original).
We have come to look upon the problem of heredity as identical with the problem of development. The word heredity stands for those properties of germ-cells that find their expression in the developing and developed organism. When we speak of the transmission of characters from parent to offspring, we are speaking metaphorically; for we now realize that it is not characters that are transmitted to the child from the body of the parent, but that the parent carries over the material common to both parent and offspring....
It may be said in general that the particulate theory [Morgan here includes Mendelism] is the more picturesque or artistic conception of the developmental process. As a theory it has in the past dealt largely in symbolism and is inclined to make hard and fast distinctions. It seems to better satisfy a class or type of mind that asks for a finalistic solution, even though the solution be purely formal. But the very intellectual security that follows in the train of such theories seems to me less stimulating for further research than does the restlessness of spirit that is associated with the alternative [i.e. physiological, epigenetic, cytoplasm-centered] alternative conception. The purely adventurous character of any explanation offered by the reaction theory seems more in accord with the modern spirit of scientific theory....
...the facts...go far towards showing that the central axis of the chromosome is not lost in the resting nucleus, but remains to become the center of the next chromosome [after a cell division]...If we look upon the spinning process of the chromosome as a process by means of which its peripheral substance is thrown out into the nucleus to form the reticulum, and assume that most of it fails to return the next time the chromosome becomes distinct, we have an hypothesis in conformity with many facts at least, and also a view that makes simpler, perhaps, our interpretation of the meaning of the process....
If Mendelian characters are due to the presence or absence of a specific chromosome [or part of a chromosome], as Sutton's hypothesis assumes, how can we account for the fact that the tissues and organs of an animal differ from each other when they all contain the same chromosome complex... [W] e must be prepared to admit that the evidence is entirely in favor of the view that the differentiation of the body is due to other factors that modify the cells in one way or in another. This consideration is, to my mind, a convincing proof that we have to deal with two sets of factors -the common inheritance of all the cells to produce all the kinds of tissues and organs in the body, and the limitation of that property in the course of development. If the former is due to the chromosomes and the unspecialized parts of the cytoplasm, the latter may be due to the local changes that the relation of the parts to each other calls forth. It might even be argued that since in the development we find no evidence of a sorting out of the chromosomes that produce special parts, the individual chromosomes can not stand each as the representative of these parts, but rather that each part needs the entire set of chromosomes for its normal life (Morgan 1910) .
If another branch of zoology that was actively cultivated at the end of the last century had realized its ambitions, it might have been possible to-day to bridge the gap between gene and character, but despite its high-sounding name of Entwicklungsmechanik nothing that was really quantitative or mechanistic was forthcoming. Instead, philosophical platitudes were invoked rather than experimentally determined factors. Then, too, experimental embryology ran for a while after false gods that landed it finally in a maze of metaphysical subtleties. It is unfortunate, therefore, that from this source we can not add, to the three contributory lines of research which led to the rise of genetics, a fourth and greatly needed contribution to bridge an unfortunate gap...
What has been said so far relates to the action of the gene on the cytoplasm of its own cell -its intracellular action. Those of us working with insects or plants are apt to think of genetic problems in this way, and are inclined to consider mainly the effects that do not reach beyond the cells in which they are produced. But in other groups, especially birds and mammals, the effects of the genes are not always so limited. We are on the threshold of work concerned with the isolation of the so-called sex-hormones, the end-products of the thyroid gland, the pituitary, the thymus, and the substances isolated from the suprarenal bodies (Morgan 1932 ).
In Wettstein's formulation of the [theory of the] "plasmon" as "bearer of developmental process"...we come nearer to the point of view of many biologists who deny that Mendelian genes are the sole representatives of the material of heredity. This denial is generally without experimental foundation; it rests primarily on the need to find a principle of unity in organic development. It rests on the disinclination to be forced to treat the organism as an aggregate of determinants, the complete independence of which cannot guarantee the unity of the organism...
[A]lthough the various authors supporting this point of view have quite different positions regarding the question whether this substance [i.e., the plasmon] is localized in the nucleus or the cytoplasm, they agree in maintaining that not all developmental stages and phenotypes of organisms are determined by genes, i.e., by discrete entities...
Thus the "unitary" conception, according to which the totality of the hereditary material is given in the genes, is opposed by the dualistic conception just described.
Can we refute one or the other of these positions by experiments at this time? Not by means of classical Mendelism. For in order to recognize or to localize genes, we need two organisms that differ in some particular traits, and even if we can trace certain fundamental properties (such as chromosome form or size) back to Mendelian genes, it appears to me to be completely impossible to remove the force of the dualists' arguments by analysis of hybrids. Johannsen put it like this: "...By analysis of hybrids we have examined only the clothing, the underlying organization remains unanalyzed. Whether we will ever be able to strip kinds of organisms [Gattungen, a word then used for races, species, and genera in German] of their superficial characteristics in such a way as to reveal the ultimate X of our formulas -a fundamental substance, something quite general and organic, something that, like a homozygote, is not accessible to Mendelian analysis -that remains an unanswerable question (Hertwig 1934, p. 428) [translated by RB, emphases in the original, references omitted].
If as is generally implied in genetic work (although not often explicitly stated), all of the genes are active all the time, and if the characters of the individual are determined by the genes, then why are not all the cells of the body exactly alike?
The same paradox appears when we turn to the development of the egg into an embryo. The egg appears to be an unspecialized cell, destined to undergo a prescribed and known series of changes leading to the differentiation of organs and tissues. At every division of the egg, the chromosomes split lengthwise into exactly equivalent halves. Every cell comes to contain the same kinds of genes. Why, then, is it that some cells become muscle cells, some nerve cells and others remain reproductive cells?...
[The recent results of Spemann on cell interactions and the organizer] are of interest because they bring up once more, in a slightly different form, the problem as to whether the organizer acts first on the protoplasm of the neighboring region with which it comes in contact, and through the protoplasm of the cells on the genes; or whether the influence is more directly on the genes. In either case the problem under discussion remains exactly where it was before. The conception of an organizer has not as yet helped to solve the more fundamental relation between genes and differentiation, although it certainly marks an important step forward in our understanding of embryonic development (Morgan 1935) .
The location of genes in the chromosomes, the proof of their linear order, the association of somatic characters with definite points in the chromosomes, in short, the whole development of the gene theory is one of the most spectacular and amazing achievements of biology in our times. The embryologist, however, is concerned more with the larger changes in the whole organism and its primitive systems of organs than with lesser qualities known to be associated with genic action. As Just remarked [in a AAAS symposium, Dec. 30, 1936] , he is interested more in the back than in the bristles on the back and more in the eyes than in eye color.
Now that the necessity of relating the data of genetics to embryology is generally recognized and the "Wanderlust" of geneticists is beginning to urge them in our direction, it may not be inappropriate to point out a danger in this threatened invasion.
The prestige of success enjoyed by the gene theory might easily become a hindrance to the understanding of development by directing our attention solely to the genom [sic], whereas cell movements, differentiation and in fact all developmental processes are actually effected by the cytoplasm. Already we have theories that refer the processes of development to genic action and regard the whole performance as no more than the realization of the potencies of the genes. Such theories are altogether too one-sided (Harrison 1937) .
Genetic restriction [i.e., differentiation] then depends upon the removal by the nucleus of certain materials from the cytoplasm, leaving others free. The free materials determine the character of the cell... With each cleavage each nucleus fixes all material other than that which makes the blastomere what it is… Then the potencies for embryo-formation are all present in the uncleaved egg...
[The] conception of the action of the genes as unalterably fixed entities can not explain differentiation of development. For how could the genes be responsible for differentiation, if they are the same in every cell [ (Lillie 1927) ]? Unless the geneticists assume that their genes are omnipotent, we can not understand how the problem of differentiation can be solved by the genetheory of heredity.
Every cell in an organism becomes what it is because its cytoplasm has free its particular potencies whilst the nucleus binds all others. These latter would, if left unbound in the cytoplasm, act as obstacles to the display of special potencies (Just 1939 , chapter 11, first and third paragraphs quoted in Gilbert 1988,) .
[On the basis of the evidence presented in this paper, it is a plausible hypothesis that a developing embryo includes a pre-pattern, perhaps itself controlled or altered by genes, to which certain genes respond by causing (or not causing) the formation of a particular localized differentiated feature such as a bristle.] What was called the response of a gene needs to be defined in exact terms. There is some evidence that all genes act, that is participate, in cellular physiological process continuously in every cell. If this evidence is sound, response in differentiation would not signify an awakening from inactivity, but only a rise of activity, or an outcome of activity different from what had occurred. If a necessary prerequisite for a specific differentiation were the production of a specific molecular species, then "response" may mean nothing but linking together or otherwise transforming, by the same enzymatic power which was exerted all through development, molecular groups which had not existed before the pre-pattern provided for their establishment. It is possible to interpret certain well established differences in the appearance of one and the same narrow band in the giant chromosomes of different tissues of the fly as indicators for differential activity of the same gene in response to different internal environments.
The cellular physiology of differentiation -the specific mechanisms by means of which an embryonic cell is transformed gradually, and at the end usually irreversibly, into a differentiated cell -remains obscure. Some investigators believe that differentiation is based upon alternative stable dynamic equilibria of specific reactions. Others think of differentiation in terms similar to the Roux-Weismann theory of development applied to suspected selfperpetuating particles in the cytoplasm instead of in the nucleus, which become segregated into different parts of an embryo or undergo differential changes in different regions. Either of these views can be linked with the concept which holds that differentiation is the result of response of specific genes to specific pre-patterns. An excellent basis for this concept has been provided in the studies of Sonneborn and Beale on antigens in the unicellular ciliated animal Paramecium. At present three groups of genes are known which determine the antigenic characters of these organisms, but a member of only one group will show its presence at any time by the production of a specific antigen. Which one is expressed depends upon the state of the cytoplasm. There is a cytoplasmic state favorable for the expression of the g-genes, another cytoplasmic state favorable for the expression of the d-genes, and a third for the s-genes. The cytoplasmic state itself is under external control. Three slightly different temperatures may call forth any one of the three states. Imagine a tissue composed of hundreds of Paramecia. Apply the three different temperatures to different areas of this tissue. Then in each area one specific gene out of the three concerned would respond to the temperature pre-pattern set up in the tissue, and a patterned differentiation into three antigenically distinguishable types of cells would result (Stern 1954) [references omitted, italics in the original].
